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Introduction
Since the Second World War, collective memory in France has played a significant role in
cultural, social, and political debate surrounding the idea of French national identity. France’s
past is often revisited, and at times reconstructed, by governments, political parties, and leaders
in order to support their arguments, justify their policy decisions, and reinforce conceptions of
French national identity. Consequently, varying narratives of France’s role in the Second World
War, as well as its colonial past, have emerged, creating a fractured landscape of historical
representations. The narratives surrounding the Second World War can help us to understand the
function of collective memory in French politics. This essay will argue that the memory of the
Second World War has played a significant role in foreign policy discourses and show that
leaders continue to draw upon the past to justify their policy decisions today, particularly during
discourses concerning European integration.
To show the significance of collective memory in French politics, I will analyse primary
sources which highlight the use of historical references in foreign policy discourses and show the
discursive strategies employed by political leaders to garner support for their foreign policy.
These sources include official speeches, political statements, and declarations in which political
leaders draw upon the past and attempt to frame history around common reference points which
help to explain and justify their policymaking. I will also draw upon secondary literature which
outlines leaders’ expressed viewpoints and actions to assess the extent to which the framing of
memory reflects certain political objectives. An analysis of Charles de Gaulle’s speeches and
actions will provide evidence of the significance of collective memory in the aftermath of the
Second World War, while an examination of President Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy
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discourse will highlight the extent to which collective memory remains prevalent in French
foreign policy today.
Defining Collective Memory
As it refers to a rather abstract concept, the term ‘collective memory’ is difficult to define
and therefore often the subject of some debate. I argue that the term ‘collective memory’ refers to
a group’s shared memories of the past that may be employed and reconstructed by political
actors in the present. French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs coined the term ‘collective
memory’ in 1925 1, providing an important framework for the study of memory in a broader
social context. Halbwachs argued that social structures and institutions shape the way in which
history is remembered. He explained that the group to which individuals belong constructs the
memory that individuals will preserve, and therefore the collective memory of any society is
intentionally shaped by those who hold sufficient power and status to reconstruct past historical
events and in turn define the memories of the wider public.2
Applying Halbwach’s theory of collective memory to a contemporary Europe, Jan Müller
explains that the death of Holocaust survivors, forced laborers, and all those who participated in
World War II encouraged and intensified debates about history3, exemplifying Halbwachs’ idea
that collective memory does not prevent varying and distinct accounts of history. Instead, these
individual accounts depend on the social group that a person belongs to and therefore depend on
the way in which this memory is constructed from within the social group. Müller developed his
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ideas about the functioning of collective memory in the present, claiming that both politicians
and the wider public no longer care for the historical truth, but rather how this history can be
used to “make moral claims'' and “prompt political action.”4 Müller here reinforces the idea that
politicians stray from the truth with specific goals and a political purpose in mind. Wulf develops
this idea further, explaining that “the past is not merely preserved but is continuously and
selectively reconstructed in the light of present interests, needs, and aspirations.”5 When we
accept the notion that politicians have the capacity to reconstruct the past, along with the idea
that memory can be manipulated to suit the political needs of the present, it is clear that
collective memory plays an important role in the political arena.
Collective Memory and National Identity
Meike Wolf argues that we can better understand national identity through the lens of
collective memory. According to Wolf, “the individual needs the social group not only as a social
framework for his or her memory but also for identity.”6 It is therefore necessary to consider how
the state can act as the social group that Halbwachs repeatedly refers to. Wolf explains that
conceptions of nationhood often originate through the construction of the “self and the other”7, as
states attempt to distinguish themselves from the wider international community in pursuit of a
secure national identity.
Pierre Nora’s major contribution to the study of collective memory also considers the
relationship between collective memory and national identity. Nora’s Les lieux de memoire, a
collection of seven volumes published between 1984 and 1992, explores the role played by
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memory in the construction of a collective identity. The idea at the foundation of Nora’s work is
that the history and identity of a nation relies upon an “array of sites of memory that have been
invested with enduring and emotive symbolic significance.”8 These sites may take the form of
places, objects or ideas which hold historical significance for a nation, for example, a monument,
a museum, or a symbol such as the French figure of Marianne. For Nora, "the memory of the
past is central to the identity in the present.”9 This idea may suggest that the pursuit of a secure
national identity acts as a motivation for the reconstruction of history by political actors in the
present.
Establishing a Link between Collective Memory and Foreign Policy
Since the collective memory of the past significantly influences identity in the present, it
is unsurprising that political leaders often draw upon history in foreign-policy discourses. Given
their status, power, access to the media, and ability to reach millions of people, political leaders
are ideally positioned to reconstruct the past and influence national collective memory in order to
pursue foreign policy objectives. Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose explain that the
constructivist approach to international relations provides a lens through which we may better
understand the link between collective memory and foreign policy. The importance of the
‘cultural and institutional framework’10 that underpins policymaking and the way in which policy
is received by the wider public suggests a significant link between collective memory and
foreign policy. Wittlinger and Larose argue that collective memory “plays a pivotal role in
determining the limits and possibilities of policy by providing ammunition to promote...or reject
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certain policy options.”11 This aligns with Halbwachs idea that interests of the present determine
which aspects of history are remembered, forgotten, or reinterpreted, and helps to explain the
significance of collective memory in foreign policy discourses today.
When we discuss the prevalence of collective memory in political discourses, it is
necessary to consider the idea of memory-framing. Alex Mintz and Steven Redd provide an
analysis of framing in foreign policy settings, discussing the way in which individuals and
institutions frame their policies in foreign policy discourses. They draw attention to the specific
intentions of political leaders, explaining that they often employ discursive strategies that will
“affect how the targets themselves as well as the public and other actors (e.g., media) perceive an
issue”12 This supports the idea that the framing of history is an important strategy which allows
leaders to emphasise a shared experience and in turn garner support for their policy decisions.
Eric Langenbacher’s collection, Collective Memory and International Relations, provides many
examples of ‘framing’ and the way that words, images, and symbols from the past are employed
by policymakers in the present. He explains that political actors ``invoke these tools from
precedent to legitimize their current dispositions and future plans.’’13 For this reason, an
understanding of how collective memory is framed is significant in understanding foreign policy.
In Langenbacher’s collection, various authors discuss the tools used by political leaders
to frame the past in a particular way. These tools include the reconstruction of past narratives, the
application of historical analogies, the creation of memory sites, and the forgetting of the
different aspects of history. Langenbacher explains that these tools allow political leaders to
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portray an actor or state as a “villain, victim, or liberator,”14 therefore influencing the direction of
international discourse and negotiations. This supports Wolf’s claim that the construction of the
‘self and the other’ plays an important role in the framing of foreign policy as political leaders
attempt to distinguish themselves on the international stage.
Memory of World War II in France
An exploration of the narratives of the Second World War in France will provide an
important understanding of French collective memory and its significance. The presentation of
World War II, in particular the narratives surrounding the French resistance against the Nazi
occupation of France, was highly influenced by the need to promote a positive and secure
national identity, both domestically and on the international stage. In his book about national
recovery in Western Europe, Peter Lagrou explains that leaders encouraged their populations to
identify with the resistance as a means of “legitimising their role in post-war international
politics.”15 A narrative that emphasises French success and liberation was therefore introduced
and imposed from above by de Gaulle and other elites, suppressing the memory of French
collaboration with the Nazis and constructing the foundation for a new national collective
memory. Henry Rousso’s Le Syndrome de Vichy centres around Charles de Gaulle’s presentation
of wartime France as a nation of resistance. Immediately following the war, de Gaulle promoted
the idea that it was the Gestapo, not the French police who had deported French Jews, and that
France was victorious since the country had overcome the collaborationist Vichy regime.
This heroic presentation of the French resistance, along with the idea of ‘self-liberation’
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from the Nazi occupation represented an opportunity to unite France, constructing a foundation
upon which France could rebuild as a major power. Raoul Girardet explains that the extent to
which the French collaborated with the Nazis was repeatedly minimised as de Gaulle
intentionally shifted focus onto the bravery and success of the resistance.16 Although the
resistance movement constituted as low as two percent of the population, the myth of the
resistance has become “embedded in constructions of French national identity” and has
“consistently been used to considerable effect in political discourse.”17
While French collaboration is often acknowledged today, present day actors continue to
portray the Vichy government as a distant entity in national collective memory that is separate
from the country’s national identity. This reconstructed narrative of events, which minimises
important aspects of French history, invoked the memory of past glory and contributed to the
idea of French greatness and France as a symbol of liberty, rights, and justice. From the past to
the present, French leaders have chosen to minimise aspects of history which contrast with this
vision of French grandeur, instead focusing on events which reinforce this vision. The myth of
self-liberation underpinned this idea, presenting a unified independent France. French national
identity remains rooted in its history and leaders continue to project, to both its citizens and the
world, an image of a global leader with a duty to protect. This explains why national collective
memory continues to emphasise the Resistance Movement as an integral aspect of French
identity and why the memory of the Second World War remains prevalent in foreign policy
discourses.
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De Gaulle: A Case Study
1945 – 1953
An exploration of Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy towards Germany, along with an
analysis of his speeches will show how he influenced the national collective memory of the
Second World War and used the past as a tool to justify and explain his policy. As chair of the
provisional French government, de Gaulle immediately introduced a narrative of self-liberation
in August 1944 when he declared “Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liberated by its
people…with the support and help of all France,” reflecting his desire to re-establish France’s
position on the world stage. Peter Lagrou explains that “being liberated was too passive a mode
to celebrate the recovery of national independence, and gratitude was a weak basis for national
identity.”18 Although de Gaulle made sure to emphasise his individual role in the liberation of
France, he was aware that it would be necessary to include the wider French public in the story
of the French resistance and self-liberation to provide a basis for national recovery. In an attempt
to begin a new regime, de Gaulle depicted a collective effort during the French fight for freedom,
promoting the idea that entire nation had contributed to the resistance movement,19 and appealing
to the principles that underpinned French national identity. While this narrative would help to
garner support for the new republic, it also encouraged the French government and French public
to reflect upon the country’s past victories, re-establishing France’s vision for itself and its
perceived role in the world as it embarked on a journey of recovery following the war.
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In most cases, the framing of memory allowed for the reconstruction of national identity,
and, in certain cases, the framing of memory underpinned de Gaulle’s pursuit of bilateral and
multilateral negotiations and agreements. In a speech on France’s role in peace in July 1946, de
Gaulle claimed that “We French are among those who always remain on the stage and have
never changed camps,”20 in order to depict a proud and strong France before outlining his foreign
policy objectives. His speech continued:
“A harmony presupposes an understanding between London and Paris. This understanding our
country has long sought - let us say frankly at the price of many sacrifices. Certainly, when it was
necessary in 1914 and again in 1939 to face up against those who sought to enslave Europe,
England and France were side by side, sword in hand, from the first day to the last.”21
Once again, de Gaulle attempts to suppress the memory of the Vichy Regime and French
collaboration, instead promoting France as a nation of resistance and suggesting that the minority
underground resistance was emblematic of French actions during both world wars. He promotes
this version of the past in order to reinforce the idea of French grandeur, suppressing the memory
of any events that conflict with the strength of French independence and security. De Gaulle’s
promotion of the idea that “England and France were side by side, sword in hand, from the first
day to the last'' seeks to rewrite the events that occurred less than ten years prior, constructing a
new memory for the wider public to preserve. This exemplifies Müller’s argument that
politicians are prepared to undermine historical truth and presents the way in which the past can
be used to “make moral claims'' and “prompt political action.”22 De Gaulle here attempts to
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appeal to shared experiences of war and victory in war, suggesting these are important and
justified motivations driving his decisions, in this case cooperation between France and Britain.
De Gaulle’s public attitude towards European integration fluctuated over time. De Gaulle
and Gaullists supported the dismemberment of Germany immediately after the Second World
War, proposed a US-Britain-France triumvirate that excluded Germany in 1958, and eventually
pursued a close bilateral Franco-German relationship after 1962.23 These abrupt changes in
direction required explanation and justification, often resulting in a change in the framing of
memory in his foreign-policy discourse.
In the aftermath of World War II, France's policy towards Germany centred around the
prevention of German aggression. De Gaulle looked to separate the coal-rich Saar region from
Germany, integrating it into the French economy and having Germany pay reparations,
principally to France, in the form of coal.24 De Gaulle also wanted to separate the Rhineland
from Germany and called for the complete demilitarisation of the country in an attempt to
guarantee French physical and economic security.25 He also sought to ensure that a future
German government be decentralised to neutralise Germany politically. In his 1946 speech, de
Gaulle outlined these plans, expressing his belief that France had a responsibility to protect
Europe from such atrocities. He declared,
“France, in dealing with others, has the duty of opposing the possibility that Germany
should again become a unified and centralised state, or in short, the Reich, whose structure and
power have always resulted in warlike enterprises”26
23
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De Gaulle’s attempts to distance France from the actions of the Nazis with whom the Vichy
government collaborated, while emphasising the threat and need to contain Germany, supports
Wolf’s argument that conceptions of nationhood often rely on the construction of the “self and
the other”27 In this case, Germany is the ‘other,’ and therefore poses a threat that France has a
duty to contain. De Gaulle also draws upon events prior to World War II, explaining that
Germany’s structure had “always resulted in warlike enterprises,” calling attention to their past
behaviour to strengthen the idea that his policy was necessary and justify his support for a
decentralised German government.
While the early governments of the Fourth Republic initially echoed de Gaulle’s desire to
punish and dismember Germany, senior members of the French government soon realised that
France would be unable to contain Germany through its current policy. As Britain and the U.S.
looked to reinvigorate West Germany, and concerns surrounding the Cold War mounted, it
became clear that a change in tactics would be necessary in order to advance French interests.28
The French government and important French elites, in particular Jean Monnet and Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman, proposed the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), driving the construction of a united Europe. Monnet and Schuman supported
supranational integration which would delegate sovereign powers to central European
institutions; an idea that de Gaulle vehemently opposed. De Gaulle was highly critical of the
ECSC and described its central institutions as a “cabal.”29 De Gaulle repeatedly expressed his
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opposition to European supranationalism, citing the importance of upholding French
independence. During a press conference, de Gaulle declared that “the only possible Europe...is
that of states” and described debates surrounding European integration as a battle between the
“utopian myths of supranational power.”30 He believed that an effective Europe would be a
Europe made up of independent governments with their own unique histories and cultures and a
system in which national sovereignty would maintain control over European institutions.
Although no longer French leader, de Gaulle continued to wield significant influence in
France, and in a press conference in Paris in 1953, he reiterated his vision for Europe, opposing
the creation of a new European Defence community. While he declared his support for defence
cooperation between states in Europe, he spoke sternly against the establishment of the European
Defence Community (EDC). The EDC was proposed by the French Prime Minister, Rene
Pleven, and looked to establish a European army among the six member states, including West
Germany. 31 In his press conference, de Gaulle stated,
“In wartime, the French Government would find themselves totally excluded from the defence
of France. If, during the last conflict, from 1940 to 1945, the French Government
had bowed to such a regime, if, in the coalition of which he was part, he had not kept the right
and means of deploying French troops, Leclerc would not have taken the Fezzan and would not
have been launched, when necessary, on Paris, and Alsace would not have been defended” 32
He draws upon the memory of the Second World War to support his argument against the EDC
and emphasises the importance of an independent French army. De Gaulle calls attention to the
past in this way as a means of explaining his opposition to a defence community that could
potentially weaken French sovereignty. He also continues to highlight Germany as a threat in this
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press conference, suggesting that it would be dangerous to include West Germany in plans such
as these:
“It is absolutely false that the so-called European army treaty can rearm the Germans without
rearming Germany at the same time. It is, however, very clear that this treaty combined with the
current American policy, leads directly to military and political hegemony of the Reich in
Europe.”33
Here de Gaulle presents his opposition to any form of German rearmament due to the fear of a
return to German militarism and the danger that this would represent.34 Despite his calls for some
level of cooperation between European states, de Gaulle continues to stress the importance of
French independence, while also perpetuating his narrative from 1945 that constructs Germany
as the ‘other’ that threatens French security
De Gaulle: 1958 - 1969
An analysis of de Gaulle’s speeches and symbolic gestures from 1959 onwards will
highlight the difference between his framing of memory in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War and the framing of memory following his return to power. The contrast in the
presentation of history allows us to identify the way in which collective memory can be moulded
and manipulated in order to suit the needs of the present and support the pursuit of different
policy objectives. Following the collapse of the Fourth Republic, Charles de Gaulle returned to
power as the head of the Fifth Republic after twelve years largely spent away from the public
eye. The establishment of the Fifth Republic had been a direct result of a right-wing military
coup in Algiers in 1958, and the political crisis of 1958 had left France deeply divided 35. In
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response to these existing divisions, de Gaulle redirected public attention to France’s glorious
past, commemorating the Resistance movement and reinforcing conceptions of French national
identity. Benjamin Stora explains that de Gaulle emphasised the “unified character” of the nation
upon his return to power. During the 1960s and 1970s, forty-three war museums opened in
France to commemorate the First World War, the D-Day invasion, and the Resistance movement
of the Second World War. 36 Stora explains that this was an example of the way in which de
Gaulle relied upon the imagery of France’s past and his own personal achievements during the
Resistance, to reinforce the memory of French glory and direct attention away from the Algerian
war.
The opening of war museums is an example of the way in which de Gaulle employed the
memory of the Second World War to maintain the image of French greatness. With his return to
power in 1959, de Gaulle had developed a new policy of grandeur that centred around French
independence, nuclear deterrence, military expenditure, and the independence of the national
armament industry and arm exports.37 This policy of grandeur that prioritised national
independence remained consistent throughout de Gaulle’s time in office. He cemented the
importance of French independence in his New Year speech on January 1st, 1964, when he
stated:
“Between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31 (1963) we did not have to fire a single cannon shot, which had not
happened in the space of a quarter of a century. It is a fact that we are, through the creation of our
first atomic weapons and the modernisation of our forces, in the process of taking our destiny in
hand, which had, since 1940, been in the hands of others.”38
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This represents de Gaulle’s tireless determination to preserve French independence, particularly
away from reliance on the U.S., through nuclear armament. He here suggests that nuclear
armament will allow France to “reclaim its destiny,” suggesting that he seeks to increase French
security and defence independently of the U.S. However, in his previous speeches that discussed
the events of the Second World War, de Gaulle had consistently promoted the idea of
self-liberation and emphasised France’s ability to overcome the Vichy Regime. In his New Year
speech of 1963, de Gaulle appears to acknowledge that France did not liberate itself when he
explains that France’s destiny “ had since 1940, been in the hands of others.” De Gaulle draws
upon this aspect of French history, despite the fact that it contradicts his own narrative of
self-liberation, in order to explain and justify his pursuit of nuclear weapons. This exemplifies
Wulf’s argument that the past is continuously and selectively reconstructed in the light of present
interests, needs, and aspirations.”39
It is clear that the narrative of French grandeur that he promoted between 1945 and 1953
to reject supranational authority in the form of the ECSC and the EDC remained an important
characteristic of de Gaulle’s foreign policy discourse throughout his presidency. Despite this, by
the time de Gaulle re-entered the French political arena in 1959, it was no longer of use to
oppose French membership in the existing European communities. Instead, he would have to
look to use these structures to advance French interests. It was therefore necessary to reframe the
memory of the Second World War through a process of reconciliation with Germany. The
potential to increase French power and build a European power-bloc independent of the US may
have been the driving factors behind de Gaulle’s support for cooperation with Germany.
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However, it is of great value to examine the narratives, symbols, and discursive strategies
employed to facilitate Franco-German cooperation and to garner support for this idea among the
French public. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1959, these strategies would be of great
importance as he prepared to consolidate Franco-German relations at the head of Europe.
In 1961, in an attempt to strengthen French defence, de Gaulle pursued the Fouchet Plan
which involved the creation of a new ‘union of states’ that would cooperate on issues of
foreign-policy and defence. He continuously emphasised the intergovernmental character of the
plan and the capacity of members to act independently of the U.S. Due to competing visions
among states concerning Europe’s place in the world, along with the hardening of the French
position, discussions eventually stalled and never resumed.40 Following the failure of the Fouchet
plan in 1961, de Gaulle turned his attention back to Germany and the West German Chancellor,
Konrad Adenauer. The two developed a close political partnership, underpinned by the theme of
reconciliation, and eventually consolidated by the signing of the Elysée Treaty in 1963 which
started the process of Franco-German integration around common security and defence policies.
41

De Gaulle saw strong bilateral relations with West Germany as an opportunity to increase
French power, although he remained firmly against any idea that constituted reduced sovereignty
due to the importance of upholding French independence and the idea of French grandeur. Since
he had spent a significant amount of time shifting blame away from France and onto Germany
for the atrocities of World War II, as well as emphasising France’s duty to contain Germany, it is
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necessary to consider how de Gaulle framed the need to cooperate with Germany when
presenting his vision for closer relations. De Gaulle and Adenauer employed a distinct strategy to
promote Franco-German relations. While de Gaulle pursued the establishment of France as a
leader of Europe and Adenauer sought to solidify West Germany’s attachment to the West, the
two framed their aspirations in terms of Franco-German reconciliation. The symbolic acts that
preceded the Elysée agreement helped to reconstruct the relationship between the two countries,
drawing upon the idea of a shared past to frame their bilateral relations as a reconciliation which
held a unique significance for both peoples.
In Bilateral Identity‐making and European Security, Hofmann explains how symbolic
gestures enabled de Gaulle to “project a bilateral community of fate based on shared memory of
conflict and bloodshed.”42 In 1962, the two leaders prayed together in the Reims Cathedral
which had been destroyed during the First World War before attending the first joint military
parade during which French and West German troops marched side by side.43 Shortly after, de
Gaulle accepted Adenauer’s invitation to tour the Federal Republic of Germany where both
leaders voiced their intentions to work together and forge an agreement that would connect their
peoples and policies. The Reims cathedral represents a memory site which holds an emotive
significance for both French and German peoples. De Gaulle and Adenauer’s visit to the
cathedral signals that they were drawing upon memories of the past in an attempt to foster a new
atmosphere in which a future Franco-German agreement would be received. This exemplifies
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Langenbacher’s idea that leaders will often employ symbols from the past to legitimize their
current dispositions and future plans.44
Many of the first European treaties, whether ratified or not, contain references to the
question of Franco-German reconciliation. The common declaration that precedes the Elysée
Treaty describes the agreement as a “reconciliation” that will end “a centuries-old rivalry,
constituting a historic event which profoundly transforms the relations between the two peoples.”
45

It was this transformation of relations that required a change in the framing of the past. The

reference to a “centuries-old rivalry” in the common declaration highlights the way in which the
two leaders repeatedly drew upon the past to frame their rapprochement as a necessary
reconciliation when presenting their vision for close bilateral cooperation. In the same way that
De Gaulle called upon the past to portray Germany as ‘the other’ and explain the enmity between
France and Germany in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, de Gaulle and
Adenauer’s relationship called upon the past to explain and justify Franco-West German
rapprochement. Historian Wilfried Loth explains that “the French president made sure that the
reconciliation between Germans and French became deeply anchored in the cognisance of both
peoples.” This supports the idea that the past can be used and manipulated to suit the political
needs of the present and highlights the framing of history as an important strategy which in this
case allowed leaders to emphasise a shared experience and in turn garner support for their policy
decisions.
The memory of French glory, reinforced by the myth of the resistance, remained
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consistent throughout de Gaulle’s tenure. He employed these memories of perceived glory to
emphasise the importance of French independence, reject supranational proposals, and pursue
nuclear armament during his time as president. When we consider the way in which de Gaulle's
framing of the past evolved between 1945 and 1962, however, a change occurred in the use of
history, resulting in a new narrative taking its place in the national collective memory. Following
the Second World War, de Gaulle repeatedly framed Germany as an enemy wholly responsible
for the fate of French Jews, minimising French collaboration and pursuing relations with Britain
and the U.S., which would exclude Germany. When it became clear that this approach was not
going to succeed as a means of increasing French power, de Gaulle once again called upon the
past, this time promoting the idea of Franco-German reconciliation to explain his change in
policy. This discursive and symbolic strategy highlights the way in which de Gaulle employed
the memory of the Second World War as a tool to justify and explain his foreign policy decisions.
Macron - A Case Study
The idea of a stronger Europe has underpinned French foreign policy since the beginning
of the Fifth Republic. Emmanuel Macron, however, has taken France’s approach to Europe one
step further, often speaking of European sovereignty "not only in geopolitical terms, but also
industrial and technological."46 When we discuss French foreign policy, particularly towards
European integration and European defence, it is necessary to recognise that the idea of French
grandeur continues to play an important role as France looks to establish itself as a global leader.
As I have shown, this sentiment was clear under the leadership of President Charles de Gaulle as
he called attention to the French Resistance in order to support his rejection of supranationalism.
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An examination of President Macron’s speeches will show that the idea of French
grandeur remains prevalent as he makes many references to the past, particularly to highlight
France’s past glory and their role on the world stage. While there is an aspect of continuity on the
broader issue of upholding French grandeur and remaining independent of the U.S., Macron’s
approach to Europe represents the shift towards supranationalism that has been developing since
Francois Mitterrand’s presidency. It is therefore valuable to explore the way in which he presents
French history as he draws upon collective memory in a different way to present European
integration as a means of achieving independence from the U.S.
Prior to his election, Macron often spoke about his vision for the future of French foreign
policy, echoing de Gaulle’s belief in France as an important player on the international stage.
In a campaign speech in 2017, Macron declared that
“We have the means to regain our rank and, above all, to implement a foreign policy which
strengthens our independence, our influence and our interests in the world. This is the course we
must follow...Thanks to our history, our heritage, our culture, and our language...France occupies
an exceptional place in Europe and in globalization. At the same time as we resolutely defend
our interests, France must fight for the values that accompany them...human rights, the place of
women and that of minorities in the world”47
Macron here discusses the importance of defending French interests and increasing French
influence in the world, while invoking memories of the past by emphasising the need to “regain
France’s rank.” This reflects the historical presentation of France as a strong, influential country
with a duty to protect others, and therefore shows that the French elite continue to promote the
idea of French grandeur. It is important to consider how the construction of French collective
memory helps to bolster this argument. While the idea of French grandeur may be rooted in the
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past glory of French history, Macron links this memory of the past with France’s current role in
the promotion and protection of human rights, presenting these as values intrinsically linked to
French history and culture. This idea has remained an important aspect of French national
identity and is therefore embedded in the minds of French citizens. This reflects Pierre Nora’s
idea that the memory of the past is central to identity in the present,48 as Macron appeals to the
ideals traditionally associated with French identity to promote his vision for France and its place
in the world.
Despite Macron’s emphasis on France’s duty in the world and his perpetuation of the idea
of French grandeur, in one of his first speeches as French president at the Sorbonne University in
September 2017,49 the president called for further European integration in defence and security to
transform the EU into a true political player on the global stage. In recent years, the approach
towards independence in French foreign policy discourse has evolved. While de Gaulle focused
on absolute independence underpinned by nuclear armament and bilateral agreements that
strengthened French security, Macron places emphasis on the capacity of France to increase its
influence, strengthen its security through European institutions, and assert its independence from
the U.S. This approach towards EU foreign policy and integration is representative of France’s
shift towards the acceptance of supranational authority in Europe. References to France’s past
glory, however, remain prevalent in his foreign policy discourse. It is therefore necessary to
consider the way in which Macron unites the idea of French grandeur and the need for further
European integration, using collective memory to do so. In his Sorbonne speech, Macron stated:
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“Europe alone can, in short, ensure real sovereignty, that is to say our ability to exist in
today's world in order to defend our values and our interests. There is a European sovereignty to
be built, and there is the need to build it.”50
While de Gaulle totally rejected supranationalism and pursued French independence ,
Macron’s discourse reflects his focus on guaranteeing independence from the U.S. His speech
highlights his belief that supranational institutions can strengthen French security and increase
France’s influence in a world in which the U.S. has turned its attention away from Europe. The
French leader therefore looks to convey European cooperation as a means of maintaining French
influence in the world as this ensures that France does not rely on the U.S. in the field of security
and defence. Discussing Europe, Macron told French policy journal Le Grand Continent,
“The United States will only respect us as allies if we are earnest, and if we are
sovereign with respect to our defence. We need to continue to build our independence for
ourselves.”51
Here, Macron calls upon members of the EU to continue efforts to increase cooperation in the
area of defence, emphasising the importance of European independence from the U.S. Both de
Gaulle and Macron stress the importance of defending French interests, with the former arguing
that supranational authority represents a threat to French interests and the latter arguing that
supranational institutions allow for the protection of French interests. To reconcile the ideas of
European sovereignty and French grandeur, Macron defines sovereignty as “France’s ability to
exist in today's world in order to defend our values and our interests,” drawing upon the past to
show that Europe strengthens France’s ability to defend its values and interests. While de Gaulle
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repeatedly called upon the memory of the war to explain his rejection of supranational authority,
Macron uses the memory of war to support his pursuit of further integration and promote the idea
that
“this Europe which has made it possible to turn our backs on war, we must regain our ambition.
Today we hardly know anything about the destroyed cities, about these fathers, these sisters,
these children who are buried with their throats tightened by misfortune...Let us seriously ask
ourselves the question of the future we want and let us together have the courage to build it.”52
Macron’s reasoning that increased cooperation will help to guarantee peace in Europe is
an idea that remains at the foundation of the argument for European integration. Macron here
employs collective memory as a tool to support his belief that further integration is necessary to
maintain France’s status in the world; an idea that requires a belief amongst the public that he is
acting in the interest of France. The Sorbonne speech presents the way in which Macron draws
upon the memory of both world wars in an attempt to convey the importance of European
cooperation and garner support for his plans for further integration. While de Gaulle
concentrated on the victory of the French resistance to bolster his arguments against the
Schuman Plan, and supranationalism generally, Macron frames his speech around the shared
memories of loss and tragedy across Europe to justify his pursuit of policies that involve further
integration. Although both leaders champion French independence from the U.S, they use the
memory of the Second World War to advocate for different means of achieving this goal. Each
leader draws upon different aspects of French collective memory in order to support their
arguments for and against supranational authority. This exemplifies the way in which different
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aspects of the same past are emphasised by leaders “to legitimise their current dispositions and
future plans.’’53
In a speech in Berlin in 2017, Macron once again called upon the shared memories of war
to justify his future policy towards Europe. He stated:
“The European project aimed at stitching back together a ripped continent; at bringing back
together the enemies of yesterday; at giving back peace and economic prosperity to a territory in
ruin…We have to prepare a necessary treaty change, and we have to start now. That is why we
do need at the same time a European ethic, a revamped democratic method, renewed policies,
then renovated institutions. But we need to unite people. A European ethic, a desire to live
together, an awareness of our shared identity, a loyalty to our values.”54
Here we see how Macron connects events from the past to his plans in the present, this time
linking the collective memory of the Second World War to the need to renovate European
institutions and implement treaty changes. This illustrates the way in which leaders link specific
aspects of national history to their policy positions, supporting Müller’s argument that history
can be used to “make moral claims'' and “prompt political action.”55 Macron employs this
discursive strategy in his pursuit of European integration, to influence how the public perceive
the issue. It is clear that Macron repeatedly draws upon the existing national collective memory
of war to support his belief in European sovereignty and garner support for this idea amongst the
public and other actors.
While there is a shift in the presentation of history to support French policy towards
European integration and supranationalism, the narratives surrounding Franco-German
reconciliation represent a clear example of continuity in French collective memory since 1959
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and the way that it is used as a tool in foreign policy discourse. As President Macron and
Chancellor Merkel navigate a tumultuous European landscape against which Britain’s exit from
the EU and increased nationalism look to threaten European integration, the need to convey a
strong partnership at the head of Europe is more important than ever. For this reason, the theme
of Franco-German relations remains prevalent in contemporary discourses as the pair attempt to
project an image of European strength and power. In a campaign speech discussing the
challenges facing France, Macron stated:
“The European project is based on the Franco-German reconciliation. There is a cultural
dimension in the broadest sense that we should never forget, countries and people who killed
each other now work together. It is not because we do not think in the same way, because our
immediate interests sometimes differ, but because we share a history made of bloody conflicts
that we need each other, and that Europe needs us together.” 56
Here we can identify the continuity in the framing of memory as Macron evokes a
familiar memory discourse about the Second World War, calling attention to the horrors of war to
emphasise the importance of Franco-German relations and their ability to work together to
strengthen the EU. Macron’s rhetoric displays a strategy that appeals to past experiences as
motivations for future actions. In this case he suggests that Europe “needs Germany and France
together” to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again. Previously, I have discussed de
Gaulle’s attempts to ensure that the idea of Franco-German reconciliation became deeply
anchored in the cognisance of the French people. This means that successive French leaders, in
this case Emmanuel Macron fifty years later, are able to draw upon this memory to support their
actions in the present. This exemplifies Halbwachs’ argument that political leaders and
institutions can shape the way in which history is remembered. Since de Gaulle’s government
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reinforced the importance of Franco-German reconciliation, this remains a significant aspect of
history in the memory of the wider public. This in turn allows Macron to employ de Gaulle’s
narrative of Franco-German reconciliation as a tool to amass support for his proposal to
strengthen Franco-German ties even further.
In the same way that De Gaulle and Adenauer adopted a distinct strategy to promote
Franco-German relations, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel have often performed
symbolic gestures that call attention to their shared history. In November 2018, on the centenary
of the 1918 armistice, the two leaders attended a railroad museum for a commemorative
ceremony.57 While this may not be as extravagant as de Gaulle and Adenauer’s procession to the
Reims Cathedral, this gesture represented an important commemoration of Franco-German
reconciliation. Merkel and Macron were visiting the museum that houses a replica of the
Compiègne wagon, the train carriage in which the Armistice of 11 November 1918 and the
Armistice of 22 June 1940 were signed by Germany and France. During the highly symbolic
ceremony, Macron and Merkel signed the guestbook, laid a wreath together, and unveiled a
plaque celebrating their reconciliation. The plaque read:
“On the centenary of the November 11, 1918 armistice, Mr Emmanuel Macron, president of the
French Republic, and Mrs Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the federal Republic of Germany, here
reaffirmed the value of Franco-German reconciliation in the service of Europe and peace."58
As the place where the armistice was signed, the wagon became an important memory
site that holds a cultural significance for both French and German peoples. The visit marked the
first time since 1940 that leaders from the two countries had met at the historic location. Pierre

57

"Merkel Et Macron À Rethondes Pour Une Cérémonie Très Symbolique", Le Monde.Fr, 2018,
https://www.lemonde.fr/centenaire-14-18/article/2018/11/10/merkel-et-macron-attendus-a-rethondes-pour-une-cere
monie-tres-symbolique_5381726_3448834.html.
58
Ibid.

27

Nora’s memory site theory is underpinned by the idea that the present identity of a nation relies
upon memory sites “that have been invested with enduring symbolic significance.”59 When we
regard the Compiègne wagon museum as an important memory site, it becomes clear that the
chosen location represents an intentional political message. The joint ceremony, at the place
where the two countries had previously met in times of war, reinforces the narrative of
reconciliation, and aims to promote the importance of Franco-German cooperation. The two
leaders’ visit to the symbolic location underlined the close ties between two countries that fought
two wars in less than 30 years, but now present themselves as the guarantors of peace in Europe.
In another symbolic act in January 2019, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel met in
the German city of Aachen to sign a new treaty on Franco-German cooperation and integration.
The city is where Charlemagne, the king who united large parts of western and central Europe
during the Middle Ages, was buried, and therefore represents another symbol of European unity.
60

The treaty was created to renew the basis of the Franco-German cooperation originally defined

in the 1963 Élysée Treaty. The Aachen Treaty’s preamble made reference to the history of
Franco-German reconciliation, suggesting that this continues to act as an important driving force
of Franco-German cooperation in the 21st century:
“Acknowledging the historic achievement of the reconciliation of the German and French
peoples to which the Treaty between France and Germany of 22 January 1963 on
Franco-German cooperation which has been the foundation for an unprecedented network of
bilateral relations between their civil societies and public bodies at all levels” 61
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This highlights the way in which the narrative of Franco-German relations remains prevalent in
current foreign policy discourses, particularly as a driver of Franco-German cooperation. The
signing of the Elysée Treaty was a significant moment in the history of Germany and France, as
well as Europe as a whole. The fact that the Élysée Treaty signalled the end of a centuries long
rivalry and constructed an important foundation for successful European integration, suggests
that the decision to mention the treaty in the preamble of the new agreement was an intentional
strategy to highlight the European spirit of the agreement. The Aachen Treaty aims to increase
cooperation and unity through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms which address a wide range
of policy areas, including foreign and defence policy. Outlining France and Germany’s aims to
take their bilateral relations to the next level, the treaty states:
“The close friendship between Germany and France has been decisive for a united, efficient,
sovereign and strong European Union and continues to be an indispensable element.”62
Macron and Merkel vowed to develop their levels of cooperation at the bilateral as well
as a European level, making references to Franco-German reconciliation to signal that both
leaders are committed to the friendship that underpins peace in Europe. They continue to
promote a shared vision of foreign policy interests and democratic values, despite their
differences in opinion on several issues, to maintain the image of a strong Europe with strong
leaders at its head. In a time when increasingly populist and nationalist sentiments are spreading
across Europe, Merkel and Macron seek to preserve the image of their countries’ strength and
unity, drawing upon the history of Franco-German reconciliation to reinforce the importance of
the Franco-German relationship in Europe today.
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The renewed agreement with Germany was highly criticised by France’s far-right, in
particular the leader of the far-right National Rally, Marine Le Pen, who claimed that the treaty
would see the French region of Alsace placed under Germany's ''tutelage'' and accused Macron of
weakening French sovereignty. President Macron responded to these claims in a formal
statement titled The Truth on the Franco-German Treaty.63 The statement called upon the
memory of war in Europe to emphasise the necessity of the agreement, presenting the
Franco-German relationship as a linchpin of peace on the continent:
''By trying to rekindle the ashes of a rivalry between France and Germany, those who are
spreading false information are betraying all the work of reconciliation that enables us to live in
peace…They are betraying the memory of our ancestors who sacrificed their lives in the
conflicts of the 20th century, and they are threatening our security.''
While memories of war and reconciliation have the potential to fade as time passes and
new generations arrive into the political sphere, Macron continues to reinvest these ideas into
current debates, and therefore preserves the national collective memory that exists. In responding
to Marine le Pen’s claims, he draws upon the sacrifice of soldiers who fought in the two world
wars, reinforcing the memory of war in an attempt to promote the treaty as a guarantor of peace.
This once again highlights how political leaders draw upon history in light of present interests,
needs, and aspirations, employing collective memory as a tool to justify policy, and in this case,
to quell the criticism that the Aachen Treaty has received.
Conclusion
The memory of war has held a significant place in French foreign policy discourse since
the end of the Second World War, culminating in a national collective memory consisting of
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various narratives concerning France’s past greatness and the Franco-German relationship. It is
important to recognise how both leaders sustain the fundamental idea of French grandeur that
remains at the foundation of the country’s national identity. Both de Gaulle and Macron draw
upon France’s past glory to uphold the vision of France as an important global actor that wields
significant influence on the world stage. De Gaulle’s promotion of the resistance myth and
Macron’s repeated calls for France to re-establish its influence are emblematic of this vision and
highlight the way in which the events of the past remain a central aspect of identity in the
present. Although both leaders stress the importance of France’s global status and influence, they
each prescribe a different means of achieving this goal vis-a-vis European integration. While de
Gaulle envisioned a French state completely independent of other actors, Macron focuses his
attention specifically on independence from the U.S. Each leader calls attention to different
aspects of the memory of war to support their opposing points of view. De Gaulle directed
attention to the memory of the French resistance and self-liberation to underline the importance
of sovereignty and reject supranationalism. On the other hand, Macron discusses the destruction
and tragedy of war to justify his support for European supranational authority, arguing that this
integration allows France to defend its values and interests, regain its rank in the world and
therefore protects France’s status and influence. Despite their differing attitudes towards
European integration, we can identify continuity on the broader issue of France’s place in the
global order and the way in which both leaders use France’s past as a tool to explain and justify
their policy towards Europe.
While de Gaulle and Macron draw upon different strands of collective memory to present
their arguments for and against supranationalism, the framing of Franco-German reconciliation
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has remained consistent since de Gaulle’s return to power in 1959. From the image of Germany
as an aggressive actor that posed a threat to France and Europe to the image of Germany as a
close partner that would help to guarantee peace, de Gaulle's change in his framing of the past
represents a pivotal moment for French collective memory. The discursive and symbolic
strategies pursued by de Gaulle allowed him to embed this narrative into the national memory of
the Second World War, paving the way for the future of Franco-German relations. The numerous
references to Franco-German reconciliation in Macron’s speeches both before and after his
election suggest that de Gaulle succeeded in embedding this narrative into the country’s
collective memory, highlighting the extent to which political leaders shape the national memory.
De Gaulle’s use of history to support his arguments and policies shows the significance of
memory-framing in the aftermath of the Second World War, while the evolution of his narrative
presents the way in which collective memory can be reconstructed to align with present interests.
Macron’s speeches on foreign policy show that the memory of World War II remains prevalent in
contemporary settings, exemplifying how France’s past is often revisited to explain and justify
policy decisions. Collective memory has continued to play a significant role in French foreign
policy discourses as leaders continue to frame history around common reference points which
help to reinforce conceptions of French national identity and encourage the public to support
their policy towards Europe.
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